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Preface
The Federal Reserve has been praised for its response to the current finan-
cial crisis because it introduced a zero interest rate policy more rapidly than
the Bank of Japan, during the Japanese crisis of the 1990s, and embraced
massive “quantitative easing.” However, despite vast capital injections, the
banking system is not lending in support of the private sector. 
Senior Scholar Jan Kregel compares the current situation with the
Great Depression and the Japanese crisis. The similarity lies in a reliance on
monetary and exchange rate policy to reflate asset prices and restore nor-
mal functioning of the financial system. The “liquidity trap” idea was used
to explain the Bank of Japan’s decision to introduce a zero interest rate pol-
icy because previous efforts to boost lending through massive increases in
bank reserves had failed. Nevertheless, the banks continued to accumulate
reserves without further lending. Kregel notes that the Japanese equity and
real estate market bubble of the late 1980s is eerily similar to the recent
bubble in the United States. 
Contrary to current perceptions, Irving Fisher, not John Maynard
Keynes, dictated New Deal policy. Keynesian-style deficit spending was
adopted only in an emergency after tax increases (which look disturbingly
similar to those discussed by the Obama administration) produced an eco-
nomic downturn. Ultimately, the Roosevelt administration attempted to
use every means to reflate prices and incomes to precrisis levels so that
debtors could meet their commitments. The government encouraged price
reflation through monetary expansion, suspended the gold standard and
devalued the dollar, raised prices and wages in agriculture and manufactur-
ing, and provided legislative support for firms to act as a cartel and set prices. 
Kregel finds an absence of New Deal measures and institutions in the
current rescue packages. The lessons of the Great Depression suggest that any
successful policy requires fundamental structural reform, an understandingof how the financial system failed, and the introduction of a new financial
structure (in a short space of time) that is designed to correct these failures.
In the absence of eligible borrowers, the only impact of lower interest rates
is lower household and bank incomes. And as yet, there are no proposed
measures to support bank earnings.
The basic problem is that the financial system has reduced its liquidity
cushions and virtually eliminated liquidity. Moreover, the crisis has
destroyed the lending mechanism based on leveraged securitization for the
private sector without there being another mechanism to take its place.
Kregel believes that increasing incomes of households and businesses is the
best way to cover losses and resolve the liquidity problem. The current cri-
sis could have been avoided if increased household consumption had been
financed through wage increases, and if financial institutions had used
their earnings to augment bank capital rather than bonuses. 
A fundamental change in financial structure through a series of regu-
latory measures and new regulatory institutions is a key element missing
from current policy. The problem is not that the banks are not lending; it
is that they are lending only to the Fed. The “modernized” financial struc-
ture created in 1999 has broken down, and current policy to resurrect this
structure would only lay the groundwork for the next crisis. A clear road
map for a new financial system is more important than a replacement
mechanism that removes impaired assets from bank balance sheets.
Kregel provides an account of why the financial system failed, and
points out that the current economic slump would have been short if price
readjustments had been restricted to the buyers of liabilities associated
with securitized mortgage entities and the underlying subprime borrowers.
Policies should ensure that increased productivity is reflected in increased
real wages for households, and that financial system earnings are directed
more toward capital than toward labor. The current system has failed
because it was built on an incentive system that did just the opposite. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
April 2009
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Introduction
Despite the creation of a myriad of Federal Reserve (Fed) special discount
window facilities, unlimited swap lending to central banks worldwide, and
the creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), there appears to
be no improvement in financial market conditions. In particular, it is
widely lamented that, even with massive capital injections, the banking sys-
tem is not lending to support the private sector. Comparing the current
government response with those to the Great Depression in the 1930s and
the Japanese crisis in the 1990s reveals surprising similarities—and the
absence of at least three crucial factors. The similarities lie in the initial
reliance on monetary and exchange rate policy to reflate asset prices and
prevent deflation in goods prices in order to restore normal functioning of
the financial system. The differences relate to the absence of (1) direct
measures to support bank incomes through interest rate policy, (2) an
understanding of the failures of the “modernized” financial system, and
thus (3) a clear design for the shape and structure of the financial system
that is to replace the current one. The third factor may be the most impor-
tant deficiency related to attempts to emerge from the current crisis.
A Diagnosis Is More Important Than a Cure
The prevailing diagnosis of the difficulties involved in reviving the finan-
cial system is based on the idea of a “liquidity trap.” This explanation is
similar to the response during the Japanese equity and real estate market
bubble of the late 1980s, which was eerily similar to the recent bubble in the
United States. It was evoked to explain the decision by the Bank of Japan (BoJ)
to introduce, in 1999, a zero interest rate policy (known by the acronym
ZIRP) in light of its failure to induce and boost lending by Japanese banks
It’s That Vision Thing through massive increases in bank reserves. To the frustration of the BoJ (and
American economists who supported its policy), Japanese banks simply
accumulated the reserves without further lending. There was populist pres-
sure against such policy from politicians whose constituents faced falling
incomes due to the virtual disappearance of interest income from postal sav-
ings accounts, which were a basic source of income for seniors and retirees.
”Liquidity trap” initially referred to the creation of high-powered
money by the central bank that was “trapped” on the asset side of banks’
balance sheets without expanding deposit liabilities representing loans to
businesses. This could be viewed as a collapse of the money multiplier, or
the velocity of circulation. The interpretation was based on the framework of
the quantity theory equation of exchange, which suggests that a stable ratio
of reserves to deposits means an increase in reserves, leading to a multiple
expansion of loans and deposits, and thus an increase in the money supply. 
When Japan’s central bank finally moved to introduce ZIRP in 1999,
the liquidity trap became a descriptive statement rather than a theoretical
explanation. If the rate of interest is zero, it cannot by definition be
reduced.1 In this version of the liquidity trap there is no increase in lend-
ing because it is implicitly assumed that the rate of interest at which the
demand for loans equals the supply (given by the money multiplier) is neg-
ative. (Alternatively, the collapse of the IS curve produces an intersection
with the LM curve at a negative interest rate.) Equilibrium is thus blocked
by the positive constraint on interest rates.2 Indeed, in conditions of defla-
tion, it is possible that real interest rates would rise, pushing the economy
even farther from equilibrium. 
This ZIRP version of the liquidity trap led commentators such as Paul
Krugman3 and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to propose that the BoJ carry
out a policy of reserve expansion à outrance, or what is now known as
“quantitative easing,” in order to produce inflation (or at least raise infla-
tionary expectations) sufficient to drive the expected real interest rate into
negative territory. Indeed, Bernanke (2000) argued that if such a policy car-
ried on for a sufficient period of time, as a matter of logic it would
inevitably lead to an increase in lending and rising prices.4 It was also sug-
gested “that the BoJ should attempt to achieve substantial currency depre-
ciation through large open-market sales of yen. Through its effects on
import-price inflation . . . , on the demand for Japanese goods, and on
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expectations, a significant yen depreciation would go a long way toward
jump-starting the reflationary process in Japan” (Bernanke 2000, p. 160).
This was actually attempted in July 1999 but resulted only in yen appreci-
ation, largely because the United States was unwilling to allow the value of
the dollar to rise.5
Some Measures from the Depression Era
This approach to policy echoes Irving Fisher’s proposal for dealing with the
Great Depression: reflation through monetary expansion.6 Fed regulations
then in force, however, made it difficult to carry out this policy. Notes
issued by the Fed had to be backed by commercial loans and gold. The Fed
could increase the money supply by discounting its member banks’ eligible
assets (i.e., commercial loans), but such assets were in short supply. A
change in legislation (the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932) was required in order
to allow District Reserve Banks to increase the outstanding supply of
Federal Reserve notes through the purchase of Treasury securities (i.e.,
what is now the normal policy of open market operations). Following poli-
cies consonant with the recommendations of economists such as Fisher
and those from the Chicago school (to engineer a reflation by expanding
the money supply), the Fed embarked on a policy of buying Treasury secu-
rities that successfully increased bank reserves. This policy was suspended
after a short time, however, largely due to complaints from the banks that
were among its intended beneficiaries. The basic reason was that the banks
were not eager to expand lending when there were few qualified borrowers,
or to see lower interest rates when their major source of income was inter-
est on Treasury securities. Thus, the Fed’s expansionary policy rapidly
reduced bank incomes to a level where they were insufficient to cover oper-
ating expenses. Abandoning the policy of monetary expansion and allow-
ing interest rates to rise supported bank incomes, even if it subsequently
led Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, in their Monetary History of the
United States (1971), to garland the Fed with the economy’s failure because
it did not produce a sustained expansion in the money supply.7
Monetary expansion was not the only policy supporting price “refla-
tion.” The Roosevelt administration suspended the gold standard and deval-
ued the dollar in the belief that these actions would also raise commodityprices and support reflation.8 Moreover, in 1933 the administration intro-
duced the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National Industrial
Recovery Act to raise prices and wages in agriculture and manufacturing,
and to provide the legislative support for firms to act as a cartel and set
prices. The basic idea behind this approach, which had the backing of
Fisher, Jacob Viner, Herbert A. Simon, and others, was to use every means
to reflate prices and incomes to precrisis levels so that debtors could meet
their commitments.9
The Fed’s Response to the Current Crisis
It is telling that the Fed’s response to the current financial crisis has been
praised because it introduced ZIRP more rapidly than the Bank of Japan
and embraced massive “quantitative easing.” In the absence of eligible bor-
rowers, however, the only impact of lower interest rates is lower household
and bank incomes. As yet, there are no proposed measures to support bank
earnings. The change in legislation that allows interest payments on Fed
deposits does not offset the impact of lower incomes, since interest rates
are paid at a discount to the fed funds rate. Under ZIRP, this means that the
fed funds rate is effectively zero. If quantitative easing moves securities pur-
chases toward the long end of the yield curve and reduces the benchmark
rate for mortgages, it could support household disposable incomes by allow-
ing mortgages to be refinanced at lower interest rates. It seems clear, however,
that tightening loan standards means that any beneficial impact will be more
than offset by the decline in interest income on household deposits.
The resulting swap arrangements by various term-lending facilities,
through which the Fed exchanged impaired bank assets for Treasury secu-
rities, affected the composition and credit quality of investment portfolios
while having little or no impact on bank earnings. This differs, in a funda-
mental way, from the policies adopted in the 1930s and those of former Fed
Chairman Alan Greenspan, who “leaned against the wind.” He produced a
sufficient spread between short- and medium-term government security
rates to allow banks to earn enough income from riding the yield curve to
help restore their balance sheets.    
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The Change in Financial Structure . . . 
Although the New Deal policies included direct income support through
unemployment insurance and direct employment through the Public
Works Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, active
Keynesian-style deficit spending in support of incomes was introduced
only after the ill-fated decision in 1937 to balance the budget after the
recovery was under way. On the other hand, the approach at this time
included another crucial element absent from present discussions—a fun-
damental change in the financial structure through a series of regulatory
measures and new regulatory institutions. Since the New Deal measures
and institutions are well known, they need not be rehearsed here; except to
note their glaring absence in the current rescue packages, along with the
absence of any discussion about the desired post-crisis structure of the
financial system. 
Indeed, policy has changed course so frequently that there is complete
uncertainty over the emergence of a (new) financial system. Despite affir-
mation that the government does not want to run the financial institutions
and that nationalization is not an option, the aleatory approach to rescu-
ing institutions, along with retroactively binding legislation to fix compen-
sation in the financial sector, can only augment the uncertainty and
confirm the absence of any clear strategy to reregulate and reform the
financial system.
. . . Is a Key Element Missing from Current Policy
This point is important to the issue of why banks have not increased lend-
ing despite various support packages. The U.S. banking system in the after-
math of the Financial Modernization Act (1999) was based on principles
that differed radically from the system arising from the New Deal legisla-
tion. The “modernized” system was founded on intermediation by finan-
cial institutions between borrowers and capital market lenders.
Encouraged by the introduction of risk-weighted capital adequacy stan-
dards, banks minimized loans held at risk on their balance sheets in order
to conserve capital and to increase pure intermediary activities by maxi-
mizing fee and commission incomes. It should not be surprising that bank
lending has not lately increased because banks had already ceased to lendin the new system, and losses have reduced their own capital, requiring a
reduction in the size of their balance sheets. The fact that capital markets
stopped buying the loans originated by banks because of a lack of trans-
parency concerning risk meant that credit ceased for the entire system.  
The second element supporting bank earnings was leverage, which was
created through a series of mechanisms linked to particular institutions
and instruments under the “shadow banking system.” Many of these insti-
tutions have either disappeared or sharply reduced their exposure, along
with the declining market for instruments that supported the system.
These developments, in concert with exhortations from regulators to
reduce leverage, suppressed the availability of credit to the private sector.
This result was not because banks failed to lend but rather because of the
breakdown of the “modernized” financial structure created in 1999.
Although current policy appears to be designed to resurrect this structure,
it is unlikely to do so. In the absence of alternative approaches, re-creating
the “modernized” structure would only lay the groundwork for the next
crisis. The lessons of the Great Depression suggest that structural reform
has to be part of any successful policy that restores financing to the produc-
tive sectors of the economy. But creating that system requires an under-
standing of how the current system failed.
Why the Current System Failed
To understand this failure, it is important to recognize how the (now col-
lapsed) originate-and-distribute system differed from the traditional orig-
inate-and-fund system. Under the New Deal financial structure, bank loan
officers would originate loans and the reserve desks would find the deposits
or interbank lending needed to satisfy the statutory reserve ratio. If the sys-
tem came up short, the Fed provided the reserves. For an individual bank,
however, there are secondary reserve assets (i.e., liquidity cushions) when
shortfalls arise from an excessively exuberant loan officer or from a decline
in the quality of loans and an increase in charge-offs. Loans initially funded
by creating a bank deposit liability thus represented an unfunded liability
that had to be hedged by a bank’s liquidity policy. Or, as Hyman P. Minsky
(2008) put it:
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“Banking is not money lending; to lend, a money lender must
have money. The fundamental banking activity is accepting, that
is, guaranteeing that some party (that is, the borrower) is credit-
worthy.... A bank loan is equivalent to a bank’s buying a note that
it has accepted.… When a banker vouches for creditworthiness or
authorizes the drawing of checks, he need not have uncommitted
funds on hand. He would be a poor banker if he had idle funds on
hand for any substantial time.… Banks make financing commit-
ments because they can operate in financial markets to acquire
funds as needed; to so operate they hold assets that are negotiable
in markets and hold credit lines at other banks. The normal func-
tioning of our enterprise system depends upon a large array of
commitments to finance, which do not show up as actual funds lent
or borrowed, and money markets that provide connections among
financial institutions that allow these commitments to be under-
taken in good faith and to be honored whenever the need arises.”
In the world of origination and securitization for the distribution of
assets after 1999, there was little or no concern for holding negotiable assets
against a loan commitment, no visible backup credit lines, and no need for
money market connections to provide funding. The loans were sold or pack-
aged in trusts with other loans and then sold (often presold) to another
arm’s-length securities institution, which was classified as a variable interest
entity and organized to issue its own capital market liabilities in order to pur-
chase the bundles of bank-originated assets. These special purpose vehicles
(or special investment vehicles) were created to ensure the nonrecourse
transfer of the risk of first loss from the originating/issuing bank to the own-
ers of the trust—the capital market investors—thus removing the loans from
recourse against the issuing bank, eliminating the need to hold capital against
the loans and reducing the need for secondary sources of liquidity. 
Not only was the capital backing removed, the function of the reserve
desk was replaced by financial engineering, which produced the structure
of liabilities sold on a nonrecourse basis to the capital markets. As has now
been widely noted, this replacement eliminated the loan officer’s normal
due diligence process that judged the quality of the borrower and replaced
it with an analysis of the capital structure of special purpose entities. NoPublic Policy Brief, No. 100 13
one assessed the quality of the underlying assets purchased by the entities.
Even the structure’s due diligence was outsourced to private rating agen-
cies, whose interests were those of the issuing banks who paid the fees
rather than the loan officers or final buyers (see Kregel 2008).
But, more importantly, the liquidity cushion of secondary reserves,
along with the access to market financing that was normally held by banks
in the originate-and-fund system, disappeared in the new system. The
cushion was provided through overcollateralization or credit enhance-
ments from bond guarantee insurance companies, or through credit
default swaps. The purpose was to provide investment-grade credit ratings
to the senior liabilities, not to provide liquidity to the structure. Thus, the
movement of loans off the banks’ balance sheets not only reduced the cap-
ital backing of outstanding loans but also eliminated the liquidity cushion
behind the loans. What Minsky deemed a clear increase in financial
fragility was justified on the argument that the increased risk was diffused
and did not increase systemic fragility.
The weakest link in the system was that a large portion of the sub-
prime and Alt-A loans, many of which were written with optional
adjustable rates, were programmed to become insolvent at their reset date
if the collateral could not be sold at a profit. To simplify, the secondary liq-
uidity once held by the banks’ reserves of Treasury securities (the safest
assets traded in the most liquid market) or other easily negotiable instru-
ments was replaced by the secondhand real estate market—one of the least
liquid and most fragmented markets in the financial system. 
There was an additional perverse impact. Bond insurers and issuers of
credit default swaps who provided credit enhancement to these structures
were even less capitalized, and had even lower liquidity cushions, than the
structures they insured. As real estate prices declined and it became clear that
the nonrated equity and lower-rated intermediate-liability tranches of secu-
ritized structures would be impaired, questions arose about the creditworthi-
ness of the AA and AAA senior tranches. In response, rating agencies began
to downgrade their ratings. This meant that the sellers of credit default swap
protection had to provide additional margin to the buyers of credit protec-
tion, while the increased exposure of monoline insurers meant that they also
had to increase their margin payments. This affected a whole series of other
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Thus, the institutions that provided liquidity insurance to the structured
investment vehicles also created an additional demand for liquidity in a sys-
tem that had more or less eliminated all of the traditional liquidity cushions. 
AIG–Financial Products Corporation provides the extreme example
by writing credit default swaps with virtually no hedging and minimum
margins because its parent company had a triple-A rating. Downgrades led
to additional margin payments that soon outstripped the net worth of the
parent holding company.10 In normal circumstances, a liquidity crisis cre-
ates the need to sell position in order to make position, and this response leads
to insolvency. In the current crisis, the recognition that the securitized struc-
tures were insolvent set off a rush for liquidity that engulfed the entire system.
At the same time, rising loan-to-value ratios and the failure to verify
borrowers’ income meant that the liquidity cushion (normally provided by
the borrower’s home equity and other wealth, as well as income) all but dis-
appeared. When house prices stopped rising, it implied insolvency for the
borrowers and the special-purpose entities holding the mortgage as collat-
eral, as well as the liquidity provided by overcollateralization. But the struc-
tures never possessed a liquidity cushion in the traditional sense of liquid
assets that are sold in the market. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was
difficult to find reliable market prices for the collateral and for the liabili-
ties of the mortgage securitizations. Equally important, households had no
liquidity cushion other than the real estate market—meaning insolvency
for borrowers on or before their mortgage reset date.   
If the price readjustment had been restricted to the buyers of liabilities
associated with securitized mortgage entities and the underlying subprime
borrowers, the financial collapse would have produced a loss of wealth for
the entities and borrowers alone, and would possibly have lessened the
wealth effect on consumption and economic activity—in other words, there
would have been a short slump. But the current slump will not be short. 
Banks had warehoused or held investment-grade senior liabilities.
They, along with other financial institutions, provided liquidity guarantees
to the entities (often on a highly leveraged basis). When the securitized
entities became insolvent, there was a direct and negative impact on banks,
because the entities had to provide additional margins or the losses had to
be taken against bank capital when there were no secondary reserve cush-
ions. In combination with the demand for liquidity to provide margin oncredit enhancements, these circumstances produced what Fisher and
Minsky called a “debt deflation”—that is, it became necessary to sell posi-
tion to make position. In a market where there are only sellers, however,
there is by definition no liquidity or market price. It was impossible to
value the assets of financial institutions or the institutions’ creditworthi-
ness as counterparties. Thus, not only private sector lending came to a halt,
but lending amongst financial institutions (which normally supports liq-
uidity) also came to a halt. This result was simply exacerbated by the
response of the Fed to Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG when there
was no clearly enunciated principle to determine who would receive sup-
port and who would be allowed to fail. Even a secured loan is lost in bank-
ruptcy, so the threat that every institution is a potential Lehman Brothers
means that banks will not lend to one another, leaving the entire provision
of liquidity to the Fed as the only secure borrower. The problem is not that
the banks are not lending; it is that they are lending only to the Fed.
While the bailout of financial institutions has prevented insolvency
from turning into bankruptcy, it has done little to increase the willingness
or ability of banks to lend to private businesses or to one another. This cir-
cumstance is independent of the decline in qualified borrowers that stems
from the sharp decline in overall economic activity. The crisis has
destroyed the “modernized” lending mechanism based on leveraged secu-
ritization for the private sector (financial and business)—and there is not
another mechanism to take its place. 
Yet a clear road map for a new financial system is more important than
a replacement mechanism that removes impaired assets from bank balance
sheets. The Roosevelt administration designed a new system in a very short
space of time (1933–35).  Nearly the same amount of time has passed since
the outbreak of instability in the mortgage markets (in the spring of 2007),
but there is no clear vision of what the “New Deal” will be for the financial
system. It is also clear that policy attempts to return prices to precrisis lev-
els and save the existing system have not worked. Indeed, they probably
cannot work. The prevailing approach to resolving the crisis relies on the
notion that if impaired assets are held long enough, they will recover in
value, so that commitments can be met and banks can return to their old
ways by tightening their limits on leverage and on some financial products
(such as credit default swaps). 
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The Final Lesson from the New Deal 
The current response to the financial crisis does not appear to acknowledge
the importance of the negative impact of low interest rates on incomes,
while accepting Fisher’s idea for a resolution through ZIRP and quantita-
tive easing in order to restore asset and goods prices (an idea resurrected by
Krugman and Bernanke during the Japanese crisis). These policies did not
work in the United States in the 1930s or in Japan in the 1990s. This
approach to a “return to normalcy,” however, explains the absence of the
most important aspect of the New Deal—a rapid assessment of financial
system failures and the introduction of a new financial structure that cor-
rects these failures. 
In the 1930s, there was a firm belief that commercial bank affiliates
dealing in capital market businesses were a major cause of the problem,
and that Glass-Steagall simply got rid of the affiliates. Today’s insistence on
restoring asset values and removing “impaired” assets from the balance
sheets of institutions (and restoring them to health) suggests that these insti-
tutions will be able to generate incomes much as they have in the past. This
seems to be an impossible outcome, and it leaves one final aspect of the cri-
sis’s resolution that is associated with the New Deal and Japan’s lost decade.
Despite widespread opinion to the contrary, President Roosevelt ran
on a platform that accused Herbert Hoover of being a profligate spend-
thrift, and he promised to balance the budget in both his first and second
election campaigns. It is somewhat ironic that President Reagan ran his
campaigns on quotations drawn from Roosevelt’s speeches in support of
balanced budgets. As noted above, it was Fisher, not John Maynard Keynes,
who dictated New Deal policy. Keynesian-style deficit spending was
adopted only in an emergency after tax increases introduced in 1935–36
(which look disturbingly similar to those discussed by the Obama admin-
istration) produced a downturn in 1937. Discussion of the current stimu-
lus bill has centered on the ability of spending to create employment. But,
as important as increasing employment may be, the initial focus of govern-
ment expenditures should be to provide income and cover losses sustained
by banks and households. This recommendation is based on the fact that,
if the above analysis is correct (i.e., the basic problem is a financial system
that has attempted to function with reduced liquidity cushions and has vir-
tually eliminated liquidity), then a lack of liquidity is causing the productivesector to contract due to a lack of financing. However, increasing incomes
would cover losses and resolve the liquidity problem. If the level of govern-
ment expenditure is sufficiently high and stable to provide full employ-
ment, system liquidity would be provided automatically via stable income
and sales receipts (assuring that debts could be liquidated through the sale
of assets). The best way to reduce liquidity demands is to ensure that the
cash flows of firms and household incomes are fully employed. 
The basic difference is whether liquidity and prices can be restored
through an increase in high-powered money at zero interest rates or
through added government spending that increases incomes, expenditures,
and profits. Whether or not restoration comes from employment creation
is unimportant in the first instance, but it is important that it comes in
terms of increasing incomes for banks or households, since, in the absence
of write-offs, only increased earnings can restore balance sheets. This was
the point made by Keynes when he recommended that it would be suffi-
cient to bury jars full of banknotes and allow people to dig them up. When
banks have sufficient income, they can restore capital and recommence
lending, and when households have sufficient income to pay down their
debts, they can recommence spending. 
Until now, only the Fed has been willing to operate on the banks’ bal-
ance sheets by swapping one asset for another—transactions that do not
increase bank earnings. As noted earlier, “leaning against the wind” sub-
terfuges such as those supported by Greenspan in the 1990s can do this.
The best way, however, is to increase incomes sufficiently, so that house-
holds can meet their debt service on loans out of income and firms have
sufficient income to meet their borrowing needs. As Keynes noted, one of
the simplest ways to offset liquidity preference (i.e., to hold cash rather
than lend it to finance productive enterprise) is to increase the earnings of
households and businesses. Building hospitals and bridges would be nice,
but if it is impossible to convince politicians that this is a good thing, then
we have to support employment of “banknote-jar archeologists.”
According to Keynes, “It is not quite correct that I attach primary
importance to the rate of interest.… I should regard state intervention to
encourage investment as probably a more important factor than low rates
of interest taken in isolation.” However, as Minsky pointed out, there is a
better way to solve both the liquidity and the income problem, while also
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providing full employment: by channeling government expenditure
through an employer-of-last-resort program. This would directly increase
incomes without creating the additional financial layering associated with
more investment expenditure. Indeed, one of the major causes of our cur-
rent difficulties was that household consumption was not financed by real
wages that rose in step with productivity but rather by increased household
borrowing that fueled higher financial sector incomes. In simple terms, the
current crisis could have been avoided if increased household consump-
tion had been financed through wage increases and if financial institutions
had used their earnings to augment bank capital rather than employee
bonuses. In addition to financial reform that underwrites productive
investment and increases labor productivity, policies are needed to ensure
that increased productivity is reflected in increased real wages for house-
holds and financial system earnings are directed more toward capital than
toward labor. The current system has failed because it was built on an
incentive system that did just the opposite. 
Notes
1.  This is not the way that Keynes explained the liquidity trap. For
Keynes, the liquidity trap was a price relation—the failure of the cen-
tral bank to bring about a reduction in market interest rates by
increasing the supply of money. It was thus an expression of absolute
or complete liquidity preference. The public was willing to hold as
much cash as the central bank would create at a constant interest rate.
Keynes’s explanation was linked to expectations of the future course of
interest rates. If investors believe that interest rates have fallen so low
that they may rise by more than the square of the currently prevailing
rate, then the loss in value of a coupon security would more than off-
set the coupon yield. In such conditions, it would be rational to sell
securities at the current interest rate and hold on to the money. 
2.  Although the interbank deposit bid rate was negative for some periods
in 1998 due to the perceived risk of insolvency of Japanese banks and
the preference for holding deposits in foreign banks operating in Japan.
3.  His best-known article on the subject is Krugman (1998). 4.  “The general argument that the monetary authorities can increase
aggregate demand and prices, even if the nominal interest rate is zero,
is as follows: Money, unlike other forms of government debt, pays zero
interest and has infinite maturity. The monetary authorities can issue
as much money as they like. Hence, if the price level were truly inde-
pendent of money issuance, then the monetary authorities could use
the money they create to acquire indefinite quantities of goods and
assets. This is manifestly impossible in equilibrium. Therefore money
issuance must ultimately raise the price level, even if nominal interest
rates are bounded at zero. This is an elementary argument, but, as we
will see, it is quite corrosive of claims of monetary impotence”
(Bernanke 2000). 
5.  According to Richard Koo (2003), then U.S. Treasury Secretary
Lawrence Summers actively opposed the move after the Bank of Japan
had spent three trillion yen without clearing the move with the United
States. The attempt to intervene in the exchange markets did, however,
earn Eisuke Sakakibara, Japan’s former vice minister for international
finance, the title “Mr. Yen.”
6.  Fisher was in step with Chicago economists, who also favored an
increase in the money supply as the basis for a recovery of prices, but
they diverged from Fisher and argued that this could take place only
through an increase in demand for loans for productive purposes. It
would require public deficit spending to generate this demand. See
Davis (1968).
7.  Epstein and Ferguson (1984) also note that differences in condition
across Federal Reserve Districts and concerns over the gold backing of
currency and foreign deposits were also a consideration in the change
in policy.
8.  This is undoubtedly the source of subsequent recommendations made
to Japan in the 1990s and a plausible explanation of the clear decision
by the United States to abandon its strong dollar policy. Market strate-
gist Frank Veneroso (2008) clearly outlines the similarities between
Bernanke’s policy recommendations for Japan and the conduct of Fed
policy in this crisis, in particular drawing dire conclusions for the
value of the dollar.
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9.  Fisher’s position was supported by recognition of the impact of defla-
tion on the real value of debt that could create an incentive to sell
despite falling prices, and a process that Fisher called a “debt deflation.”
10.  AIG’s difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that premiums were
extremely low, thus high volume was required to reap high profits.
This encouraged the extension of credit default swaps to institutions
that were interested in the instruments not to hedge risks but simply
to speculate—so-called “naked” positions, which were (implicitly)
another form of leverage in the system.
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